An Evolutionary Approach to the Adaptive Value of Belief by Pinto, Anabela
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors




the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books







An Evolutionary Approach to the 
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Anabela Pinto
Abstract
The word “belief” evokes concepts such as religious or political beliefs, however 
there is more to belief than cultural aspects. The formation of beliefs depends on 
information acquired through subjective sampling and informants. Recent develop-
ments in the study of animal cognition suggest that animals also hold beliefs and 
there are some aspects that underly the formation of beliefs which are shared with 
other animal species, namely the relationship between causality, predictability 
and utility of beliefs. This review explores the biological roots of belief formation 
and suggests explanations for how evolution shaped the mind to harbour complex 
concepts based on linguistic structures held by humans. Furthermore, it suggests 
that beliefs are shaped by the type and process of information acquisition which 
progresses through three levels of complexity.
Keywords: Biology of belief, utility of beliefs, acquisition of information, meaning, 
causality, predictability, utility, bias
1. Introduction
Definitions of belief vary according to the academic field in which it is discussed. 
A large body of literature about belief stemming from areas such as philosophy, 
sociology or cognitive psychology, demarcates the concept of belief as an exclusive 
human trait. However, as the study of animal behaviour progresses and sheds light 
on their states of mind, there has been a tendency to accept that non-human animals 
hold beliefs.
There is general agreement that a belief is a mental state that predisposes the 
believer to accept some propositions as being true. Such propositions relate to 
events or things that either have or do not have supporting evidence. If I believe 
that crystals have healing power and I also believe in the third law of thermody-
namics, I am holding a belief that is not supported by evidence (the crystals healing 
power) and an evidence-based belief (the third law of thermodynamics) in my 
mind. To be more specific, a belief without supporting evidence to support its truth 
is often referred to as faith. Thus, whereas it is correct to say that Mary has faith in 
the healing power of crystals it would be incorrect to say that she has faith in the 
third law of thermodynamics.
But defining a belief as accepting a proposition as being true is deceptively 
simple. First, there is no agreement in relation to the definition of truth; second, 
the concept of ‘proposition’ suggests that beliefs are acquired through structured 
speech-based language, limiting them exclusively to humans. This requirement to 
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base the definition on language implies that babies and people unable to communi-
cate through language would be unable to uphold beliefs.
An evolutionary approach to the study of belief requires a definition that is 
applicable across species. In this sense a belief should be defined as any information 
that is held as reliable, and can be applied to non-human species [1].
In order to formulate a belief, individuals need to acquire information about 
different things, for example about the world, other individuals and conceptual 
abstractions such as freedom, honour, good and evil, electrons, energy, etc. The 
type and strength of belief is shaped by the way information is processed by the 
believer and how it is acquired. The beliefs we create about the world play an 
important role in decision-making, therefore selecting what type of information 
should be accepted or rejected is important for survival. But what does it mean 
to say that someone holds a belief? Is belief an exclusively human attribute or is it 
extended to other animals?
In order to investigate the evolutionary origins of belief, it is important to 
interpret the terms ‘proposition’ and ‘language’ outside a linguistic framework. 
Here, a proposition is interpreted as a packet of information received by individu-
als and language is understood as a system of communication that involves shared 
coded information which is understood by the sender and the receiver. As such it 
applies to humans as well as to other animals. Examples of language are the songs 
of whales or birds, human speech, or body postures that indicate mental states 
such as submission, play fight, begging for food and mating displays. Each species 
has elaborated communication codes which vary in complexity and in behaviour 
science are defined as language. The Oxford Dictionary defines language as “a 
form of human communication consisting of words used in a structured way…” 
However, this is a limiting assumption since people can still communicate by other 
coded means that do not use speech and syntactic rules. The important point to 
retain from a definition of language is that the codes by which such communica-
tion is shaped must convey meaningful information. In this sense “meaningful” 
implies that the observer perceives a signal as an indicator of something else. For 
example, a wolf observes another turning on its back offering his genitals to be 
smelled. This is a behaviour which aims to communicate meaningful information: 
a code that informs the other about an intent to submit rather than attack. This 
body posture is a meaningful belief-inducing signal which determines consequent 
responses.
Beliefs are acquired in many different ways but, at the most basic level, via 
subjective perception and information received from others.
2. Types of beliefs
This section argues that beliefs are shaped by the type and process of informa-
tion acquisition which develops through three levels of complexity as proposed by 
Pinto and Bright [1].
The first level consists of beliefs about the world, its physical structure and the 
individuals that populate it, knowledge about prey and predators, resource distribu-
tion, dangers, etc. The knowledge of this world and its physical characteristics can 
be acquired through simple observation and direct sampling. These are subjective 
beliefs that depend on the characteristics of the perceptive organs. When I look at 
a buttercup flower, I perceive it as being yellow, and this leads me to believe that all 
buttercups in the world are of this colour. To a bee, a buttercup is likely to appear 
violet. This exemplifies that the property “colour” depends on the characteristics of 
the visual organs, and not of the flower itself.
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The second level refers to beliefs acquired through social interactions and are 
created through the acceptance or rejection of information propagated by others. 
At this level individuals not only collect information about the physical properties 
of the world through others (e.g., where to find food) but also about the complex 
interactions occurring in a social group. This type of information relates to identify-
ing friends and foes, understanding social networks, recognising and predicting 
behaviours of others or identifying predators.
The third level consists of beliefs based on internal mental processes result-
ing from insight, introspection, and deduction. This is a type of information that 
embraces non-physical entities, abstract concepts learnt through information 
transfer or created by one’s own mind and may also be informed by innate intel-
lectual ability.
The conjunction between type and acquisition of information produces different 
types of beliefs as summarised in the table below and discussed in detail further on. 
Thus, as expressed in Table 1, beliefs about the world (type of information level 
1) can be acquired through three different processes: direct sampling, communica-
tion and insight. The same three level processes apply to beliefs about others and to 
abstraction-based beliefs.
The lower right corner of this matrix (box 9) expresses processes limited to 
animals with higher cognitive abilities comprising all the faculties represented in 
all the other squares. Such characteristics would be predominantly attributed to 
humans. Nevertheless, as represented in Figure 1, all animals have an ability to 
Processes of information acquisition
1. Direct Sampling
Empirical Acquisition
2. Communication 3. Insight
Type of 
information
1.  About the 
World
1
Learning about perceptible 
events in the world. Direct 











of the world 
imperceptible to 
the senses.
2.  About Others 4
Observation/Eavesdropping. 
Knowledge about others 








the states of 
mind of others. 
Attribution. 
Theory of mind. 
Folk Psychology
3.  About 
Abstractions
7
Awareness of internal states 











about things or 
events that do 
not exist in the 
physical world.
Table 1. 
Belief-information matrix. As we navigate the matrix from left to right, the processes supporting the 
acquisition of information lead to the origin of human beliefs. As we move down the matrix, the type of 
knowledge increases in complexity and becomes multi-modal this complexity is reflected in the type of 
knowledge held by animals with more developed cognitive abilities, culminating with humans.
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perform direct sampling of the world and learn about its characteristics. Later in 
evolution, many animal species developed an ability to communicate information 
about the world and themselves to their conspecifics. More recently, animals with 
higher cognitive capabilities evolved to reason using some simple principles of 
logic, to identify and attribute mental states to others, to create theories of mind 
and deal with abstract ideas about non-existent objects. These are characteristics 
mainly attributed to humans, but there is evidence that primates [2], canids [3] 
and some corvid species such as Scrub jays Aphelocoma californica [4] can attribute 
mental states to others.
3. Processes of information acquisition determining belief types
In order to acquire and store information, animals have evolved a myriad of 
sensorial systems specifically dedicated to that job. The simplest form of information 
acquisition is through direct sampling, where each individual, tastes, probes and 
assesses the physical and chemical characteristics of its surroundings. But informa-
tion can also be passed on by others through communication. New information can 
be stored through deduction, inference or insight. These processes are not exclusive 
to humans, and as we shall see, occur in many other vertebrate species.
The idea that reasoning is not exclusive to humans has been around for quite 
some time. In his book A Treatise of Human Nature, the Scottish philosopher 
David Hume (1711–1776) believed that animals were able to infer the relation-
ship between cause and effect through learned expectations in the same way 
that humans do. However, he also suggested that this “inferential” ability held 
by animals is not through reason, but custom alone. In his work “An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding” original published in 1748, Hume suggested 
that there are innate cognitive faculties shared by both animals and humans, and, 
in particular, that the ability to reason is based on empirical knowledge derived 
from repetition [5]. Nevertheless, he admitted that humans and animals differ in 
mental faculties in a number of ways, including: “differences in memory and atten-
tion, inferential abilities such as making deductions in a long chain, ability to grasp 
ideas more or less clearly, capacity to worry about conflating unrelated circumstances, 
prudence relatively to making generalisations,, a capacity for a greater inner library 
of analogies to reason with, an ability to detach oneself and scrap one’s own biases, 
an ability to converse through language (and thus gain from the experience of others’ 
testimonies).”
Figure 1. 
The diagram represents the type of information acquisition at different levels of animal cognitive complexity. 
The smallest circle includes characteristics held by humans only.
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According to Cooper, principles of basic formal logical inference are found in 
the brain of many non-human animals [6]. The claim here is that frequent sampling 
of an environment produces an understanding of subjective probabilities in the 
animal with respect to the frequency of occurrence of events. These probabilities 
might, therefore, be considered to be belief. This ability to form statistical infer-
ences has been recently observed in the kea, a New Zealand parrot [7]. So, the 
process underlying information acquisition is reflected in the formation of beliefs 
which, in turn, direct the process of decision making.
3.1 Acquiring information about the world
Evidence indicates that human infants from as early as 3 months of age can 
distinguish between animate and inanimate objects, and between biological and 
externally-caused motion [8, 9] and 8 to 10 month old infants can distinguish 
animals from non-animals, an ability unlikely to be merely perceptually learned 
[10] and most likely conceptually-driven and instantiated through evolutionary 
pressures [11]. Non-human species also have a naïve perception of basic physical 
phenomena. This is usually defined as folk or naïve physics. They also have some 
rudimentary conceptual understanding of folk physics from an early age; for 
example, what goes up must come down, that hitting small things like nuts with 
larger or heavier things such as stones is likely to break them, that a centrifugal 
force throws rotating things outwards [12]. Individuals do not need to hold a con-
cept of forces and vectors to understand that if they swing a stone on the end of a 
rope fast enough, the stone will be thrown a long way if the rope is released. Every 
human holds a concept of folk physics from a very early stage of their develop-
ment, but so do some animals. Without a basic concept of folk physics, which is 
an innate perception of the world, it would be impossible to survive and negotiate 
their environment. This innate understanding of how the world works seems to be 
evident when violations of natural laws occur. This is exemplified in dogs showing 
anxiety in face of magic tricks. Babies as well as animals look for longer and can 
show signs of anxiety when witnessing such tricks. Such anxiety can be seen in the 
videos published by the magician Jose Abonen where he performs a series of tricks 
on dogs [13, 14].
When a cat spots a bird on the top of a pole and jumps vertically, landing 
precisely on the spot, this is the result of an unconscious calculation of how much 
force to apply to the hindleg muscles. The cat jumps with a quasi-surreal precision, 
snapping its prey in a fraction of a second. Similar unconscious calculations, take 
place in the brain of a tennis player, a golfer or a snooker champion, where motor-
intuition plays a major role rather than calculation of vectors and forces.
Some time ago, there was a story in the media that a female mathematician 
calculated the precise formula that enables us to parallel park a car in the minimal 
number of moves. Certainly, the majority of are able to parallel park their car even 
before this formula was invented.
This brings us to the next point about belief. Intuition is a form of subconscious 
belief that guides our actions based on previous experiences.
So, what information do animals need to believe in order to survive? The 
world around an organism consists of physical structures and parameters such as 
temperature, odours, landscape shapes and other organisms. Living organisms 
evolved systems to detect these physical characteristics, as well the presence of 
other forms of life. In animals, these systems became increasingly complex over 
the millions of years of evolution which developed ever more specialised struc-
tures to sense, sample and assess variations in the physical, chemical and social 
environs.
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3.2  Acquiring information about the world through direct sampling (empirical 
knowledge)
Direct sampling and observation are the simplest methods of information 
acquisition about the world. This process leads to associative learning of cause and 
effect. This established association forms beliefs that can support which responses 
to adopt. Negative events will naturally elicit avoidance responses whereas positive 
outcomes will promote seeking and approaching behaviours. These actions are 
most likely based on an unconscious probability calculus based on what has been 
previously observed.
Over my lifetime I have learnt that there is a likelihood it will rain when the sky 
is covered in dark clouds, so when I go for a stroll and the sky is dark and cloudy, I’ll 
take my umbrella because I hold the belief that it is likely to rain. This action was 
taken based on an averaged probability established along life-long observations of 
the sky.
Although taking an umbrella may not be crucial to ensuring my survival, for 
those living in wild unpredictable habitats averaging causal associations between 
events can be a matter of life and death. If a particular species of poisonous snake 
has been frequently seen in the grass nearby the water hole, the likelihood of a 
close encounter is high, so avoiding that area could be a matter of life and death. 
The computed average of previous sightings induces the brain to ‘believe’ that 
such snake could be seen again. Even if the snake has moved on, the belief that the 
animal could be found by the water remains. It may not be a true belief anymore, 
because the snake has moved on, but it serves the purpose of survival. The mind 
believes the intuitive probability as if it were a true fact. Such unconscious probabi-
listic computation is an evolutionary process that enables learning and coping with 
unpredictability.
When an animal encounters a snake, it naturally reacts with a mix of fear and 
curiosity. Learning which snakes are good to eat and which ones are deadly, requires 
memory and an ability to catalogue the objects. Those who attempted to eat a 
poisonous snake probably did not survive to pass on the information. Those who 
got bitten and experienced negative sensations will avoid getting close to a similar 
snake in the future, those that managed to eat it and survived, will probably do it 
again. Each surviving individual develops a classification system of the snakes in 
its world. When a novel snake crosses the path, the individual compares it with all 
the images of previously observed snakes and the consequences of coming close to 
them. The mind created a rule where snakes that look like this are good and snakes 
that look like that are bad. This rule becomes a ‘belief ’ because in the animal’s mind 
it is held as true.
Another important adaptive process is the ability to generalise from one or few 
observations. Generalisation, discrimination and categorisation are mechanisms 
present in all vertebrates [15, 16]. They are adaptive learning processes that protect 
the animals against future dangerous encounters or promote the recognition of 
resources that provide survival.
Evolutionary mechanisms such as mimicry (a process where harmless animals 
mimic dangerous ones through the evolution of similar colouration and patterns) 
have evolved due to the ability of predators to categorise their prey. Take for 
example the red milk snake (Lampropeltis triangulum syspila), which presents a 
pattern similar to the venomous coral snake (Micrurus lemniscatus). The milk snake 
has a survival advantage because its shape and colours induce a belief of danger in 
predators. There are plenty of examples in nature where animals develop patterns 
that resemble big eyespots leading to predator avoidance. Does a bird which avoids 
eating a butterfly, after having been flashed a set of eye spots, entertain the belief 
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of having been seen? It could be said that the predator holds the ´belief´ that those 
patterns are real eyes. For the strategy to work, it has to induce a belief on the mind 
of the predator.
In this context, animal beliefs result from evidence based on present and past 
direct perceptual experience. One could argue that these examples demonstrate 
nothing more than an animal’s ability to establish causal relations and categorise 
the objects, however these are processes essential in supporting the formation of 
intricate beliefs in animals with higher cognitive abilities later on in evolution.
The association between a cause and an event can lead to the building expecta-
tions. Whereas in non-human animals’ expectations allow them to predict recurrent 
events, in humans, expectations do not need to refer to the repetition of factual 
events, but could result from a repetition of claims about events believed to be true. 
Here the repetition of the claim replaces the subjective experience of sampling or 
observing recurrent events, especially if the information comes from someone that 
is respected by the subject. It is here suggested that the search for patterns in ran-
dom events is a hard-wired process which feeds a need for predictability (discussed 
in detail in Section 5.3).
As new information is accumulated, ideas and insights not directly derived from 
empirical gathering of information can be formed. Since these ideas are created by 
progressive accumulation of information, there is a likelihood that the individuals 
develop an emotional attachment to the novel idea, especially if it has resulted in 
the solution of previously encountered problems. This process is the first step of a 
successive chain of complex processes that will eventually lead to embracing beliefs 
with great conviction.
3.2.1 Acquiring information about the world through communication and learning
In the 1960s, Karl von Frisch decoded the language of bees, discovering that 
the waggling dance of scouts indicates the position of the food source in relation to 
the sun [17]. If the bee walks upwards in the hive, it means that the food is in the 
direction of the sun. If the dance is about 30 degrees to the right of the vertical, it 
means that the food source is 30 degrees to the right of the sun and so on. Bees do 
not use rectangular coordinates (in rectangular coordinates, we describe points as 
being a certain distance along the x-axis and a certain distance along the y-axis) 
but instead they appear to work with polar coordinates (angles and distances). It is 
tempting to assume that bees know more about angles than the majority of humans 
on the planet. The question “how do the bees know the size of the angle?” tells us 
more about how humans think. When we describe a process by the use of scientific 
models it does not mean that the animals use the same model to execute the process.
For communication to take place, the information must make sense to the 
receiver, that is, it must have a semantic meaning. From an ethological perspec-
tive, meaningful information is a signal that is decoded in such a way that triggers 
a response in accordance with the content of the message. In ethology, complex 
signals used in communication are defined as language, and in this context each 
signal has a meaning. The meaning of the message may change due to variations 
introduced by the sender or differences in the perception of the information at the 
receiving end. This may lead different receivers to formulate different “beliefs” 
about the very same information. Simple signals have little scope for error, however 
the probability of occurrence of errors in signal transmission and transduction 
increases with the complexity of the signal and of its detection mechanisms. This 
is an obvious induction that follows from the rule that increased complexity offers 
more opportunities for error. These errors are likely to occur as much in animals 
as in humans who may misinterpret the meaning of the message during verbal 
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communication which, due its high level of complexity, increases the variety and 
frequency of error occurrence. Errors may therefore change the truth value of the 
original message.
Communication is a process present in all living organisms, from simple cells 
to humans. The content of the communicated information depends on how the 
signals are produced. Signals can be classified as chemical, pressure, vibratory or 
light based.
Chemical signals are detected by specific cell membrane receptors that identify 
a variety of molecules. Pressure based signals rely on detection by pressure sensi-
tive neurons. Vibratory signals are the result of sound waves propagated through 
the vibration of a medium such as water or air. Alarm calls and speech are forms of 
communication based on the production of vibratory signals. Finally, light-based 
signals are those that require vision or light sensitive neurons to be detected. The 
receiver has signal specific organs or structures that make sense of each type of 
signal inducing behavioural changes in the receiver, which may react immediately 
or store the information for a delayed response.
During communication, the sender releases information that enables the 
receiver to either react immediately or store the information for a delayed response 
which can span for as long as it is kept in memory. Information storage is the 
seedbed for the genesis of beliefs. This raises the question; does the waggling tail 
of a bee induce a belief in the receiver? It is indeed prompting a response, and the 
success of the responder in finding the food source depends on the decision to 
follow the information provided by the scout. Following the directions provided by 
this information is likely to consist of a hardwired stimulus–response code where 
the sensorial mechanisms of the receiver respond with simple if-then type of logical 
rule. This explains how, in the example above, bees can tell the position of a food 
source based on the information provided in the waggling dance. Bees do not neces-
sarily need to be empowered with a belief mechanism to follow the instructions; 
this example serves to illustrate how these simple hard-wired algorithms provide 
the original tapestry supporting more complex neuronal systems that will end up 
supporting beliefs as we understand them, in later evolutionary stages. The decision 
whether to accept the information provided by scouts as true or not, depends on the 
reliability of the signal. Since their survival depends on it, bees need to be equipped 
with systems that enable them to access how reliable (true or not) the signal is. A 
naïve receiver might accept the signal as being true without the need for subjective 
experience. If it is difficult to construct a concept of bee’s beliefs, and it is more 
likely that higher vertebrates base their decisions on beliefs formed by reception of 
information from others.
In social animals, information can be acquired in two ways; either the individual 
acquires information through ‘eavesdropping’, which means learning through 
observation of what others are doing, or through intentional communication, 
where the sender sends a signal with the aim to manipulate the receiver’s behaviour. 
Manipulation here means to induce a desired change on the other’s behaviour.
Eavesdropping and is a ubiquitous learning process among vertebrates in which 
non-intended receivers acquire information through mere observation of the 
sender. Imitation by observation is also a learning process that can induce beliefs. 
Juveniles learn through copying what adults do, without intentional intervention 
from the adult to engage in active directed teaching, and adults learn from each 
other in the same way. Ethology literature is full of examples of birds and mam-
mals learning by observation. Experiments with Norwegian rats [18] and hens 
[19] shown that when different foods are offered to a demonstrator, the observers 
emulate the demonstrator’s choices. If the demonstrator showed signals of sickness 
after eating a particular type of food, the observers avoided that food even if the 
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food offered was good. Cane Toads were introduced into Australia to protect sugar 
cane plantations from insect plagues. These frogs are highly poisonous and there 
are reports of wildlife killed by attempting to predate on them, but only the back 
is poisonous. Raptors and corvids that have evolved in the same ecosystem as these 
toads learnt to consume only the less toxic body parts of these toads. Since these 
toads have been introduced into North Queensland, the local birds did not know 
about this technique until some clever animal identified a new foraging strategy. 
There is some anecdotal evidence that Torresian crows (Corvus orru) which are 
native of Australia, have learnt to flip the toads onto their backs and consume only 
their internal organs. This behaviour became widespread among the birds through 
cultural transmission [20].
Thus, learning by observation and imitation leads is based on trust in the 
demonstrator. Trust is indeed a basic component of belief. Elephants and cattle 
follow the matriarch because they trust she will take them to greener pastures. In 
vertebrate migrations, there is always a component of “belief” in the navigation 
capabilities of the leader.
Animals that have been injured by humans demonstrate a capacity to generalise 
their distrust to the whole species, even if some humans are completely harmless. 
So, in order to place trust on others, the individuals need to hold the belief that no 
harm is likely to come from that relationship.
3.2.2 Acquiring information about the world through insight
Insight learning is defined as a solution to a problem that seems to have come 
from nowhere. It is also generally understood as being a type of learning that uses 
reason to form conclusions, inferences or judgements, to solve a problem [16].
In some cases, it might have been the result of accidental acts, in other cases 
it might have resulted from the application of trial and error for a considerable 
number of times, until a solution suddenly appeared. In the latter cases, the insight 
is in adopting the most successful strategy and improving on it. Insight learning 
has been observed in non-human animals. In the 1940’s the colourful shiny metal 
foil lids of milk bottles, delivered to the door of southern English homes, caught the 
attention of a bunch of inquisitive tits. By pecking through the lid, the birds reached 
the cream. It took it no time to conclude that this was a rich source of easy food. 
Forty years later, this behaviour could be observed among tits all over England [21].
There are thousands of stories like this describing how humans and other ani-
mals learn to improve on a particular behavioural strategy that arose by chance. The 
event might have been accidental, but the decision about repeating the behaviour 
that led to the event, and thus taking advantage of a totally accidental discovery, 
constitutes an insight.
It has already been established that the most basic form of information acquisi-
tion about the world occurs through subjective sampling or empirical knowledge, 
however there are cases where insight learning seems to have taken place as for 
example the use and manufacturing of tools. Tool use to extract food evolved inde-
pendently in different species, such as chimpanzees [22], capuchin monkeys [23], 
New Caledonian crows [24, 25] rooks [26], and dolphins [27, 28]. The fact that these 
occurrences have been described in nature in some groups and not others in the 
same species, suggests that tool use behaviour might have resulted from spontane-
ous insight learning and propagated inside the group through cultural transmission.
While insight learning itself may not lead to the formation of beliefs, the same 
neural processes involved in insight learning are likely to explain the origin of spon-
taneous beliefs. For example, when confronted with novel objects, humans may 
attribute qualities in origin and utility based on information previously observed 
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in similar objects. This leads to the formulation of beliefs about the utility or the 
source of the novel item. This may explain why certain objects are given mystical 
status without any apparent logical reason.
Establishing a causal relationship between the frequencies of certain events in 
the presence of this object may lead the subject to gain insight about its utility as 
a mystical force. This would explain the creation of sacred objects as a novel tool 
for the solution of real human problems. Attributing curative powers to a stone for 
example is creative thinking. The association between the occurrence of an event 
and the presence of a particular object induces a moment of insight establishing 
causal relationship to make sense of what just happened. For example, if an envi-
ronmental catastrophe happens just immediately after the arrival of a stranger in 
the village, there may be a tendency to associate these two salient events. However, 
the direction of the causality is more likely to blame the stranger for the freaky 
event, than blame the event for the sudden arrival of s stranger. This is probably 
because it is more frequent to attribute agency and intentionality to a human, than 
to the forces of nature.
Explanations of the physical world through these bursts of ‘insight’ instead of 
empirical evidence, have been observed consistently across the history of humanity. 
Just think of the association between epidemics and witch hunts in the Middle Ages. 
Unfortunately, the mind is faster at believing in these irrational connections and to 
seek evidence and some of these past myths persist in modern times. For beliefs? 
These beliefs are sustained not only due to social conditioning and conformity but 
also because the brain requires much more energy to think rationally, learning new 
things and seek evidence, than just accepting beliefs that are widely available and 
ready to be selected.
3.3 Acquiring information about others
Why is it important to acquire information about others? These others can be 
friends or foes, co-operators or selfish free-riders. Confusing these categories may 
be fatal to an animal or a human. Approaching a predator believing it is a harmless 
friend is a risk not worth taking. Approaching a conspecific displaying agonistic 
behaviours, can result in injury. Allowing out-group members to approach the 
in-group resources, could mean disaster. The “others” have different degrees of 
“otherness” depending on group and species membership and this deeply biological 
strategies have influenced the beliefs embraced by not only by humans but many 
other species.
3.3.1 Acquiring information about others through direct sampling and observation
Information about others can be acquired through direct observation of their 
behaviours or indirectly through informants.
Thorndike’s laws of exercise and recency establish that an animal has a ten-
dency to learn the behaviours that were most frequently displayed and the most 
recent actions [29] So, a simple computation of the frequency of different types of 
behaviours in particular circumstances enables the animal to establish a conditional 
association. Thus, information about others can easily be learnt from the frequency 
of previous agonistic or affiliative encounters with conspecifics, or through the 
observation of interactions between other individuals. Memorisation of these 
observations contributes to the formation of beliefs about the observed individu-
als. The mechanism is generalised in all animals, including humans and there is no 
need to form complex mental representation of the intentions of others in order to 
gather information about them. Assessing the frequency of behavioural patterns is 
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sufficient to predict many behaviours. If I see my neighbour leaving the house every 
day at 9:00 AM to go for a run, I can establish that he is likely to do it again tomor-
row, without creating a theory that he thinks that exercise is good for his health. 
Maybe he does it only escape his wife’s daily morning grumpiness. Independently 
of what his motivation is, I can still hold the belief that he will be running every day 
for the weeks to come.
Information about others can also be gathered without involvement of con-
sciousness. Take for example mating displays. Advertising male quality based on 
colour or exuberant ornaments is expressed in many males from invertebrates 
to higher vertebrates, with the sole objective of attracting the females’ attention. 
These signals evolved as badges to advertise quality, but that does not mean that 
these traits evolved to intentionally induce the females to “believe” that a male with 
the most exuberant traits is better. There is no intentionality in evolution of traits. 
The word “belief” is sometimes used as a metaphor to explain certain types of 
animal behaviour. It is a shortcut to a more complex explanation that may mislead 
the non-specialists. For example, in mate selection it is not unusual refer to female 
preference for males with exuberant characters as if they “believed” it was a good 
male to mate with. The use the word ‘believe’ here is a substitute to explain that 
females have inherited a genetic programme that drives them to select males with 
exuberant characteristics. It just happens that these males are also those who convey 
more survival advantages to their offspring. Physiological and morphological traits 
are also good indicators of partner quality in humans. Female’s hip-waist ratio or 
male shoulder-hip ratio are characteristics subconsciously valued by humans in 
mate selection. Evidence that most females like males with certain characteristics 
such as facial symmetry, broad shoulders etc., may not be the result of a cultural 
fashion, but rather the result of a genetically determined programme that controls 
mating behaviours [30, 31]. Nevertheless, human females are led to “believe” that 
by enhancing certain characters that signal sexuality, will attract the desired male. 
This belief is a mix resulting from evolutionary drives and culturally influenced 
fashion. So, whereas the evolutionary strategy in mate selection is to seek out 
the best partner to mate with, the tactics used by humans to attract partners are 
influenced by cultural factors and the tastes of the times. In societies where female 
breasts are valued by males, there is a tendency to seek artificial means of enhanc-
ing such indicators of reproductive quality by resorting to breast implants. In other 
societies with different cultural traditions the preference may be for large buttocks. 
This variation in preference is influenced by culture, but the motivation to select 
traits that are indicators of fitness is determined by our evolutionary story and, 
unbeknownst to us, enters the realm of cultural aesthetical preferences. Whether 
the preference is for large breasts or buttocks there is a common factor in these two 
indicators; they both indicate a reasonable amount of fat storage which would help 
survival in times of resource shortage.
3.3.2 Acquiring information about others through informants
There are three aspects to take into consideration in the process of communi-
cating information about others. First the individual must detect the present of 
another and identify its features, e.g., whether it is a member of the group or an 
intruder. Second this information is passed on using a code. Third, the code must 
contain signals that describe the identity of the other and its intentions.
Gathering information about others is important, especially when animals live 
in groups. This information is useful in different ways, contingent upon the charac-
teristics of the group. For animals living in colonies, where there is no obvious social 
structure, resource competition such as nesting places or predatory pressures on 
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the offspring are the main factors playing a role in learning about others. In social 
groups inter-individual relationships are more important. Social animals need to 
learn about hierarchies, advantages and risk in affiliative and agonistic behaviours. 
What we believe about others is an important aspect in the decisions that humans 
and other animals have to make in relation to the rest of the group.
Decision-making depends on the available information and the expectation of 
a determined solution. When one individual sends information to another about 
a third one, it is sometimes referred to as gossip. During this process individual A 
collected information about individual B, created a judgement and passed it on to 
a third individual C. Communicating information to a conspecific about others 
requires some level of intentionality and a higher level of complex thinking. It is 
difficult to imagine this process occurring without the use of language. Passing 
information about B requires complex processes such as an ability to catalogue 
the behaviours usually exhibited by B and list of signals that inform C about these 
characteristics. However, many animals can assess behaviours of group members in 
relation to others in order to extrapolate information about a third party. If member 
X always shows fear in the presence of member Y, an observer W is more likely to 
exert caution when close to member Y. The animal might have not observed any 
agonistic interaction between the two individuals in question, but the withdrawal 
behaviours of one individual may lead the observer to infer and therefore create a 
belief that the other is probably an aggressor. This mechanism however, does not 
constitute transfer of information about a third party through communication. It is 
a belief that results from direct observation and inference.
This is an example of formulation of beliefs through direct observation, but 
beliefs about others can also be formed through an informant advertising the pres-
ence of predators, putative aggressors or competitors. A problem arises when there 
is a need to communicate the qualities of others. For example, Vervet monkeys have 
different calls that identify different types of predators [32]. This requires a capacity 
for cataloguing the predators in categories and communicating them to receivers 
that understand the codes that identify such categories. Yet, it is difficult to acquire 
clear evidence on whether animals can pass on information about the intentions 
of others.
Understanding intentions requires the ability to formulate a theory of mind. 
And even if they can do so, to date there are no studies proving that animals are able 
to send information about the states of mind and intentions of others. This would 
require appropriate signals that indicated not only the presence of an aggressor 
or a predator, but also that this individual had the intention to do something. This 
something would also need a coded signal. For example, could a monkey commu-
nicate to another that his companion is fearful or has an intention to steal his food? 
Communicating others’ states of mind depends on the perception of the observer.
There is indication that some species developed an understanding of tertiary 
relationships which involve interactions and relations among third parties, even 
when the observer is not directly involved [31]. This requires an understanding of 
how each category relates to each other. In this case an individual must monitor not 
only his own relationship to others but also the relationships of others among them. 
In summary, they need to understand the social pecking order.
Learning about others through informants leads to reputation building, this is 
usually referred to as ‘gossip’. Reputation consists of a belief about a third individual 
based on information provided by another. Reputation building is important espe-
cially in the establishment of direct and indirect cooperation between individuals 
that are not directly on the receiving end of the altruistic act [32].
It has long been assumed that gossip and reputation building is exclusively 
restricted to human societies where information supporting beliefs about others can 
13
An Evolutionary Approach to the Adaptive Value of Belief
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.97538
only be passed on through conceptual language. However, in this case the concept 
of gossip is usually loaded with negative connotations. But in animal behaviour, 
the concept ‘gossip’ refers simply to passing on information about others. Gossip in 
animal societies is more reliable than in human societies because the credibility of 
the information is more often attributed to the status of the informant than to the 
plausibility of the event.
3.3.2.1 Providing information about one’s self
Although reputation building needs a chain of communicators to spread the 
message, the type of message that is being passed on is of special interest to those 
which are the focus of the gossip. Providing information about oneself induces 
beliefs in others which is important for the establishment of social relations. This 
occurs in two levels: The first level is unintentional, and subjected to evolutionary 
selection. This is reflected for example in stereotyped ritualised behaviours that are 
characteristic of a species. The second level assumes intentional motivation which 
clearly aims to induce a belief in others. Although the motivation that triggers the 
onset of the signalling sequence may not be under control of the subject’s mind, the 
decision to express it could be under volitional control. In many species, animals 
may refrain from displaying mating behaviour if the social conditions are not 
favourable. For example, lower rank male primates avoid displaying to females if 
higher rank males are close.
Recruiting help for oneself is widely present among many mammals and birds. 
For example, macaques recruit help in agonistic encounters, [33], and juvenile 
crows recruit help to feed when competing with adult groups [34]. This is a process 
based on passing on information about oneself. Recruiting help for conspecifics 
may rely on how much the recruiter is considered to be worthy of help which is a 
function of reputation. This is a type of information shared by the group and surely 
relates to cost–benefit balance of reciprocity.
3.3.3  Acquiring information about others through insight: Folk psychology and 
theory of mind
Some definitions of belief require that the believer experiences mental states and 
intentionality, but, it does not need to be so. It is sufficient to learn about behaviours 
and their outcomes to be able to predict what comes next. If a pride of lionesses is 
sleeping under a tree, this represents no danger for a herd of zebras grazing in the 
neighbourhood. Even if some lionesses get up, move around and lay back, this is an 
indication that the zebras are safe for the time being. However, there are particular 
lion behaviours that are indicators that they are ready to start a hunt. Watchful zebras 
would then be more alert to any lion movements and body postures. So, the zebra does 
not need to have a theory of mind about what is going on in the mind of the lioness, but 
instead it just needs to have learnt that after specific body postures, a lioness is likely to 
attack. This observation would trigger the zebra to emit an alarm call and make all the 
group disband. In this case each member of the group would believe the calling zebra.
However, research with non-human primates indicates that these animals have 
complex mental states, can formulate a theory of mind, are capable of tactical 
deception [35] have empathy, can assess the knowledge of others and even hold an 
incipient moral system. Studies in other species, such as dolphins, dogs, parrots 
and corvids, suggest that these animals may hold some basic belief system which 
enables them to assess and plan several outcomes in decision making. In order to 
make decisions, these animals must hold a certain level of understanding about how 
their world works, and the behaviours of others.
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As it was described above, to have an insight means that the individual found a 
solution for a problem or unexpected understanding of something without aware-
ness that reasoning processes are taking place. Insight learning occurs suddenly 
when the individual discovers new relationships based on prior knowledge suggest-
ing the absence of conscious reasoning.
This insight requires no conscious awareness of the reasoning process and there 
is no reason why it should not occur in animals. Insight learning is possibly a process 
that appears in a much earlier stage in evolution than conscious reasoning. Opinions 
about others may be the result of insight learning. When asked to justify their 
opinions about someone else, humans often engage in a posteriori rationalisation 
frequently concluding with “I just had a feeling about him”. Resorting to “having 
a feeling” as an explanation, suggests lack of rational justification for such belief 
about the other. This irrational feeling might be the result of earlier stages of the 
evolutionary processes at work.
4. Acquiring information about abstract concepts
An abstract concept refers to entities that are neither purely physical nor 
spatially constrained and are created by the mind. For example, truth, free-
dom, goodness, fairness, beauty, happiness and suffering are abstract concepts. 
Representations of numbers are also abstract concepts but the perception of 
quantities can be experimentally tested in humans and animals. There is evidence 
to support the claim that the brain has specific areas associated with knowledge 
of numbers and their relations (‘number sense’) [36] suggesting an evolutionary 
legacy of abstract, domain-specific knowledge. Abstractions such as a sense of fair-
ness also seem to have an evolutionary root. In tests described as inequity aversion 
tasks, studies on capuchins and dogs have shown that they are able to detect unfair-
ness and wrongful actions [37]. Therefore, there are grounds to suggest that the 
abstract concepts that underlie human beliefs, especially those relating to morality 
and sociality, share a common neural substrate with other species and are not an 
exclusively human novel evolutionary acquisition.
4.1  Acquiring information about abstractions through direct experience or 
awareness of one’s mental state
Due to the very nature of abstractions, we can only know if someone holds an 
abstract concept in their mind, if they communicate it to us.
If I lay down a plan for a journey, I may go through the route in my mind 
before starting the car. For example, I may choose the easiest route, or the 
shortest, taking into consideration the traffic on all possible routes. By creating a 
schema of possible routes, I am producing abstractions and when deciding to take 
route A rather than B, I base this decision on my beliefs about these abstractions. 
Route B may be full of traffic at this time of the day. Does this mean that when 
animals are considering courses of action, they are creating abstract concepts in 
their minds?
This is important to consider in social animals that hunt co-operatively. Each 
member of a pack of wolves, or a group of chimpanzees, learns how to best position 
themselves to ambush prey. One could argue that they have learnt the tactic through 
trial and error or from observation of others. However, by accepting that learning 
took place, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the animals created mental maps 
comprising abstract concepts. Once they acquired such schema, the abstraction 
supports a belief.
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The force of gravity, for example, is an abstract concept since we cannot touch 
it, or cannot see it directly. The concept derives from observations of things falling 
down. Many animals are also aware of this phenomenon, but does it mean that they 
hold an abstract concept of gravity? Do people who know nothing about gravity 
hold an abstract concept? An abstract concept could be here interpreted as a rule or 
a schema of the behaviour of things in the physical world. A further development of 
an abstract concept could be an attempt to make sense of the event.
Despite the difficulties in penetrating the minds of animals, there is however 
some empirical data demonstrating the formation of abstract concepts in pigeons 
[38] and African grey parrots [39].
4.2 Acquiring information about abstractions through communication
Whereas learning through observation and example can be acquired by many 
animals, learning about the world and others, based on narrative or verbal tutor-
ing, requires the use of speech and the ability to formulate mental models of the 
narrative’s topic.
The spreading of moral and epistemic values in society is an example of a form 
of learning abstraction through communication. We accept that biodiversity is a 
good thing, that justice and fairness should be encouraged, and that the water boils 
at 100o C. Some accept that God made the Universe whereas others prefer a Big Bang 
Theory as a form of explanation. Many people defend that humans have more value 
than animals and that killing is wrong. Some of these axioms are beliefs taken for 
granted and those who dare to go that extra mile to question them are looked upon 
with frowning disapproval by consensus or educated opinion. Most of these axioms 
were probably acquired solely by information transfer and not much introspection 
or critical appraisal.
Abstractions are assumed to be more present in human than animal minds, but 
then how are we to know what abstractions animals believe in? Abstract thinking 
allows for the creation of non–physical concepts that cannot be tested or proved, 
and abstract concepts are the very essence of complex belief systems such as 
religion.
There is a fundamental difference between religion and science. While the first 
is based on dogma and beliefs that cannot be tested, science follows a methodologi-
cal approach which requires repeatability and evidence. Nevertheless, people still 
hold beliefs about scientific issues. A theory, for example, is a formulation of a 
belief waiting to be tested and supported by evidence. The lay-person will have to 
decide whether to accept or reject experts based on appeals to authority. The deci-
sion is based on a belief whether the experts are trustworthy. The non-specialists 
simply hold a belief and an expectation, based on the information provided by 
others, that these scientific principles are true.
The majority of educated people believe that matter is made of atoms, however, 
those who can actually provide the evidence are a small proportion of the world’s 
population - the physicists. The rest of us just make a subjective decision whether 
to accept or reject that claim. Descriptions of the atom have changed in time and 
education levels. We start by accepting the wisdom of our schoolteachers that an 
atom consists of a nucleus of protons and neutrons encircled by several layers of 
electrons. As we progress in our education and knowledge, more particles and 
waves are added to the model ending up in something difficult to conceptualise by 
non-specialists such as quantum theory. As non-experts in the field, we just resign 
ourselves to the belief that what they are saying is true. Some of us may even argue 
vigorously in public in support of those who provided us with such information. 
We may accept the new model of the structure of the atom because it makes sense 
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in our logical reasoning, but so did it when we learnt about the orbiting electron 
structure suggested by Niels Bohr in the beginning of the twentieth century. Who 
are we to deny one or the other? What is under discussion here is not the validity of 
the belief, but the biological and psychological mechanisms that trigger us to accept 
those ideas.
Group membership plays an important factor in the acceptance or rejection of 
beliefs through appeals to authority, or appeals to popularity, pre-disposing indi-
viduals to accept the ideas held by the group without questioning. Challenging the 
ideologic status quo is dangerous because novel ideas can destabilise group coher-
ence. In such cases the challenger is either ostracised or submitted to persuasive 
techniques ranging from suggestive to coercive.
Social pressures to conform with the rules and behaviours that identify a social 
group are present in humans as in non-human animal societies. The difference is 
that humans exercise control over others to uphold the same abstract beliefs that 
function as a badge for group identification whereas in animals, scent and ritualised 
behaviours are the badges of their social group.
Although we are aware of the manifestations of physical dimensions, forces, 
fields, and other physical experiences, it wasn’t until very recently in the evolution 
of the brain that we started understanding the likely nature of these phenomena. 
Hopefully, we all accept that electricity is the result of the movement of electrons, 
but very few of us, unless we are physicists, have seen evidence that electrons exist. 
We simply believe what we are told by those we accept as experts. Why do some 
of us believe a physicist offering an incomprehensible theory for the origin of the 
universe, while others believe in the future predictions of astrology?
The issue is not about the object of belief, but the communication strategies of 
those that provide us with the information we believe in. Our mind is open to be 
convinced, some more open than others. Some information is accepted on the basis 
of critical scrutiny while other information is not, and this is perhaps the factor 
that distinguishes human beliefs from those held by animals: the ability to reason 
logically over the plausibility of the information.
4.3 Acquisition of information about abstract concepts through insight
Most abstract concepts are communicated through words. Sometimes there are 
no words available to explain them. For example, the very concept of ‘truth’ is a 
difficult one to explain in a way that is universally uniform. Whereas for western 
societies ascertaining the truth of a claim is important and means correspondence 
to the facts other perceptions of truth seem to align with the pragmatic theory of 
truth, which asserts that the truth of a belief on whether it has useful application 
in the world. In political dictatorships the truth of the facts is not as important as 
utility of a claim. If the claim does its job, it does not matter whether it is true or 
not. Learning abstract concepts through insight is most noticeable when a person 
is learning a foreign language. Not all words find equivalence in our own language 
and us such we learn the concept by perceiving in different sentence constructions. 
Eventually we start grasping an understanding of the meaning of the word even 
though there is no correspondence in our own language. Abstract concepts from a 
foreign language become understood by insight. For example, the Portuguese sen-
tence “pain in the soul” finds no correspondent in English. It is an abstract concept 
that refers to mental states associated with physical pain in the area of the heart. 
It covers states such as depression, sadness, longing for someone or something, 
bereavement, nostalgia. There is no word in English that encompasses all these 
mental states in one. A Portuguese person may use this expression in presenting her 
symptoms to a puzzled British therapist. However, with the progress of the therapy 
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and association of the expression with the different states of mind, the therapist 
eventually has an insight of its meaning to the client.
5. The adaptive value of beliefs
Thinkers, scientists and philosophers reach their own conclusions through 
methodological approaches specific to their field of expertise. In the process, they 
innovate, discover new methodologies, suggest theories. In summary, they gain 
insights into the problems they are addressing. When creating testable hypoth-
eses, they make assumptions held as true, testing them for inconsistencies, flaws, 
mistakes, illogicality, etc. Hopefully, after a certain amount of time and painstaking 
testing, some of these assumptions, become a ‘truth’ in the mind of the thinker and 
her followers even though it is only a hypothesis. This truth will only survive until 
new evidence refutes it. A new paradigm replaces the former and the cycle restarts. 
This paradigm shift was thoroughly discussed by the American philosopher and 
physicist Thomas Kuhn in his 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Many of our present social and personal beliefs result from cultural inheritance, 
our reliance on other people and sources we trust. Our survival depends on a large 
number of “specialised believers” telling us what to think.
We believe in the insights of others that preceded us and adopt them as truths. 
The teachings of the Buddha and the Middle Eastern religions, the insights of 
Classical Greek philosophers about the mind and nature, the discoveries of the 
Enlightenment and the progress of the industrial revolution, all are examples of 
personal insights that spread in space and time. Some insights are independently 
arrived at in different cultures and time frames, their common aspects suggesting 
that they may be intuitive across humankind. Similar social norms and recom-
mendations based on an awareness of human nature that ensure that social order 
is upheld are found in tribal societies that never had contact with each other. Some 
of these rules have deep roots in biology, such as those aimed at controlling female 
behaviour to ensure the paternity of the offspring. Many of these norms passed on 
from generation to generation become enshrined in our present cultural norms and 
are still held as unquestionable dogmas. Similarly, questioning religious and scien-
tific dogmas is still frowned upon by members of the groups that hold such doc-
trines. Individuals become emotionally attached to such beliefs and express anxiety 
and defensive reactions when such beliefs are challenged. This begs the question by 
which processes do beliefs operate to induce such strong emotional attachment?
There are aspects of the content of the belief that tap deeply into our biology [1]. 
When the information content of a belief aligns in some way with processes that 
provide survival strategies, that information perceived as meaningful is ardently 
protected and any challenge to its truth is aggressively repelled.
Which attributes make up the mind is much debated; however, their common 
features include the integration of a sensorial mechanism which contributes to 
make sense of an individual’s external and internal world. Whether or not the 
individual is conscious of that sense or meaning is irrelevant to definition, since 
proving presence of awareness in most animals empirically is impossible due its 
subjective nature. In the Descent of Man, Darwin laid out the case for believing that 
the difference between the minds of humans and other animals was ‘certainly one 
of degree and not of kind’.
There are at least four basic conditions that make a belief meaningful. First the 
belief must offer an explanation for causal events, secondly it must offer a sense of 
predictability, thirdly, the information received must be reliable and correspond to 
what is believed to be fact and finally, that belief must have some utility providing 
Evolutionary Psychology Meets Social Neuroscience
18
survival advantages [40]. But before each one of these conditions is addressed, it is 
necessary to understand the notion of meaning.
5.1 A biological approach to the concept of meaning
The concept of meaning can be approached through a philosophical point of 
view such as ‘what is the meaning of life’, a psychological cognitive approach, such 
as ‘what you are telling me makes no sense in my mind’ and through a linguistic 
approach which begs for definitions such as in ‘what is the meaning of this word?’. 
The linguistic description of meaning plays an important role in communication 
and spread of beliefs. A sound, a word, a sentence, all have meaning when they con-
tribute to the comprehension of the message. But comprehension or understanding 
is also a function of the subjective experiences of the receiver. If I say “table” it 
induces different mental images in the receiver. It can be a word that simply cat-
egorises objects with four legs and a surface high enough to allow our legs under it. 
But there are many variations of the concept table. Is it in wood or metal and glass? 
Is it unassuming with straight lines or convolutedly decorated with arabesques? 
The word table may confer a limited number of characteristics that are common 
to most people that have experienced the shape and function of furniture but its 
meaning varies accordingly to function. Is it a dining table, a coffee table or a desk? 
Whereas descriptive words for objects may be easy to define by just pointing at it 
or simply describing its function, abstract concepts may have different meanings 
to different people. For example, what is the meaning of the concept of freedom of 
speech? Does it mean I can say whatever I feel like or does it encompass a certain 
level of censorship to prevent incitement to harm others? What is the meaning of 
friendship? Does it require unconditional loyalty or does it give room for compas-
sionate lies?
Frequently, what gives meaning to some of these abstract concepts is the level 
of emotion associated with them. People who believe in freedom, or God, or 
homoeopathy may feel threatened when their beliefs are challenged because such 
beliefs define the individual, her nature, his cultural identification, her expecta-
tions. Holding strongly to beliefs provides a sense of security and predictability. 
Such emotions are defined by neurological processes that transduce the sound of 
words, to their meaning and to their emotional valence; e.g. whereas to some people 
the word spider evokes fear and the word mouse evokes of cuteness, to others the 
word mouse may evoke feelings of fear and anxiety. A thing has meaning when its 
description aligns with our preconceived mental models. If I am learning statistics, 
a t-test only has meaning if I have a prior knowledge of means and other arithmetic 
calculations. Asking someone to do a t-test on a set of numbers without previous 
understating of basic concepts, renders the requirement meaningless. Furthermore, 
it may induce a state of anxiety due to acknowledgement of ignorance about that 
subject.
The informational content of a message acquires meaning, when it is compared 
with a mental database of previously learnt units of knowledge and it aligns or 
provides incremental increases to that knowledge. It follows that meaningful 
information is more useful than meaningless information. It functions as a tool of 
survival, based on which we can induce and deduce further knowledge. It is there-
fore reasonable to assume that an emotional connection between pieces of mean-
ingful information is formed. On the other hand, meaningless information triggers 
a sense of discomfort and rejection. Meaningful information comes associated with 
an emotional protective layer to challenge. This explains the strong tendency to 
confirmation bias and rejection of new sources of knowledge that disconfirms our 
beliefs.
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Individuals develop an emotional attachment to familiar information to the 
point of suffering great anxiety when that information is deemed false.
Festinger [41] defined meaning as the perception of coherence between one’s 
beliefs and the real world. “When these things align, we are left with the sense that the 
world is ordered, controlled, and understandable. When this coherence is disrupted, 
however, meaning is threatened and we feel distressed and anxious as a result”.
The sense of meaning could then be seen as an adaptive feature derived and 
supporting beliefs. Adaptive beliefs are those which contain information that 
contribute to individual survival. A belief is adaptive if the information about what 
caused an event is reliable, predictable and useful. Beliefs shaped in this context are 
very likely to be strong which means, they are upheld in the mind with vehemency 
and any challenge to the belief is perceived as a threat to constancy. Some mental 
processes are common across species because they are built on neural structures 
that have roots in common ancestors. Perhaps the most primitive processes are those 
that refer to identifying the causes of what happens around oneself. The next step 
consists in an ability to predict future events and prediction can only be successful 
if it relies on the accuracy and reliability of previously stored information.
5.2 Causality: understanding causes and sequences of events
As discussed above the establishment of associations between cause and effect is 
perhaps the most ancient form of learning. Such associations provide the organisms 
with opportunities to test and improve its tactics during the acquisition of resources 
essential for their survival. Beliefs about the cause of events are perhaps one of the 
most important factors for survival. When we know what caused an event, we can 
somehow predict the outcome next time a similar cause is enacted. The concept of cau-
sality is coupled with the perception of agency. An agent is a living or inanimate cause 
which triggers an event, but very often humans attribute intentionality to the agent.
Detection of the cause-effect association is quite powerful and the motivation 
to find an explanation for the cause sometimes disregards rational thinking. If the 
explanation satisfies, then it is likely to be promptly accepted as true.
Explanation of causes are often associated with the presence of an agent. In 
humans, when the cause is unknown because there is no direct observation of the 
causal event, there is a tendency to create an invisible agent and attribute human 
characteristics such as intentionality. This is an important component of magi-
cal thinking and is the origin of animistic religions which created a backcloth to 
religions with deities. Animism attributes intentionality to forces of nature without 
anthropomorphic representations of entities. In animism, the believer appeals to 
the forces and energy of nature. They refer to the spirit of the elements such as the 
wind, the water, the earth as if they were fuzzy undelimited agents with conscious-
ness and aims. Religion with gods is built on this principle where the agent is no 
more the forces of nature, but some invisible figure that concentrates those forces. 
These agents can be represented as animals whose characteristics identify with the 
natural phenomenon or humans.
The assumption that we are hardwired to discern relationship between cause and 
effect induces us to pay more attention to events that coincide, or are salient espe-
cially when they support our beliefs, thus reinforcing confirmation bias and often 
supporting beliefs in the paranormal.
5.3 Predictability
Assuming predictability is a strategy for coping with uncertainty. It helps in 
planning future decision making. Uncertainty leads to anxiety and stress and, as 
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such, beliefs that promote a false impression of predictability are naturally easier 
to accept. Observations of animal behaviour and historical narratives have shown 
evidence that safe environments promote co-operation and trust among the mem-
bers of a social group, whereas instance of resource shortage and unpredictable 
social settings are conducive of social instability often expressed in varied forms of 
aggression [1].
Predictability is intrinsically associated with pattern detection. The percep-
tion of patterns, even when they are absent in reality, confers a sense of control. 
Patternicity equates constancy and repeatability [1].
The perception of patterns and the need for predictability underpin the onset 
of superstitious behaviours present in humans and animals [42]. A pursuit of 
predictability is yet more pronounced in situations marked by environmental social 
instability. For example, studies on political preferences suggested that the way 
humans perceive insecurity and unpredictable events may have some influence 
on their political beliefs. Research revealed that helping people imagine they are 
completely safe from harm can make them (temporarily) hold more liberal views 
on social issues [43, 44] and that a perception of threat can make liberals lean more 
towards conservative views [45].
When the information is provided by an informant rather than through subjec-
tive sampling, the reliability of the message can vary in levels of accuracy since 
many factors may corrupt the informational content from the time it leaves the 
informant and arrives at the receiver. The type and intensity of these modifica-
tions affect the reliability of the message and may therefore provide misleading 
information. The occurrence of ambiguity in the message is frequently interpreted 
as satisfying the desired goals inducing a belief that the message offers predictions 
that satisfy their expectations. This process is open to behaviour manipulation. 
Corrupted informational content may be unintentional, deriving from random 
mistakes or misperception, but can also be intentional where the informer sends 
purposefully dishonest signals. Since dishonest signalling is widespread in nature, 
detection systems have co-evolved to counteract such signals.
Conveying truthful and fake information are processes that promote the sur-
vival of individuals but are not without trade-offs. While cheating can be advanta-
geous to individuals that interact only once, it will work against the cheater once the 
interaction is repeated and detected. Then cheating does not pay anymore. In social 
groups where most individuals know one another, the cheater may collect imme-
diate rewards but once it is detected, it is promptly punished by elements of the 
group. However, in human social groups when the cheating is propagated through 
words that meet the desires and expectations of the receivers, the cheater can get 
away with his lies for quite a long time. Humans seem to be open to accept lies, as 
long as they align with their wishful thinking. In evolutionary terms this seems to 
be a process that would eventually vanish from the population, given its negative 
impact. However, it is not all negative, for there is also a need to conform with the 
beliefs of the group as a means of gaining protection.
5.4 Utility
Group membership in mammals is usually established by sharing similar scents. 
In humans, scent identification is complemented by the sharing similar ideas where 
thinking like the tribe becomes the equivalent of smelling like the tribe and fitting 
in the same social group. Similar scents indicate a level of kin relations and, accord-
ingly to kin selection theory based on mathematical models developed by George 
R. Price [46] and popularised by W.D.Hamilton [47], altruism and cooperation are 
more prevalent among individuals that share the highest number of genes. This 
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implies that individuals are more likely to protect those who share genes with them, 
than those who do not.
Likewise, in human societies this rule could be applied to ideas in the sense that 
those individuals that share the same stances as me are more likely to protect one 
another. These ideas were popularised by Richard Dawkins [48] who coined the 
word memes, suggesting that the transmission of information from mind to mind 
follows similar rules like the transmission of molecular information through genes 
from parents to offspring.
This convergence towards homogenous ideas inside the group may explain the 
success of religion, political factions, belief in conspiracy theories, doomsday and 
other cults, reflecting a process of group cohesion previously regulated by scent 
similarity. This is reflected by what political scientists call elective affinities—the 
notion that there is mutual attraction between ‘the structure and contents of belief 
systems and the underlying needs and motives of individuals and groups who 
subscribe to them’ [49].
Many beliefs are not derived from personal experience, but from trusted sources 
or communities. So, giving up those beliefs may threaten ties with the community. 
When established beliefs have a useful function there is a tendency to conserve 
them since the sharing of common beliefs promotes group cohesion. On the other 
hand, homogenous group thinking prevents creativity which may result from a 
reluctance to conform with established rules. Rebels threaten the cohesion of the 
group and in order to keep them under control it is necessary to develop punitive 
mechanisms that discourage deviating from the status quo [50].
Thus, a strategy based on a hierarchical system of policing develops. But this 
strategy is not exclusive to humans, or mammalian social groups. It is also observed 
in groups of social insects such as ants and bees. Note that there is a difference 
between the evolutionary concepts of “strategies” and “tactics”. While strategies 
refer to a set of behavioural adaptations that evolved over time, tactics refer to the 
individual actions taken to pursue a strategy [50, 51]. The concept of utility can also 
be observed in individuals who believe in conspiracy theories. A conspiracy theory, 
however unlikely, represents an identification badge identifying that social group. 
In human societies the sharing of beliefs plays the same function as scent sharing in 
kin related animal groups. Common beliefs are the “intellectual scent” that unites 
a group. Conspiracy theories often offer theories that contradict the prevailing or 
official narrative of facts or events. They offer alternative explanations that appeal 
to those who believe they have a reason to distrust mainstream narratives. They 
usually refer to the existence of some hidden enemy and the individual finds safety 
in the confinements of their like-minded group. The belief in conspiracy theories 
relies on faith promoted by group think rather than evidence. The individual then 
finds a false sense of safety inside these ideological bubbles.
Perhaps one of the most puzzling aspects of beliefs which confer survival utility 
is the placebo effect which seems to have positive effects in healing of the mind and 
body. Perhaps one of the main characteristics of this effect is that it is grounded 
on the human’s tendency to magical thinking and embrace convictions rather than 
simple beliefs.
6. Conclusion
It is possible to identify four basic categories of beliefs that provide meaning and 
tend to be strongly protected. Beliefs that serve some purpose have great utility, 
especially if that purpose is the acquisition of power and dominance over a group. 
Thus, promoting beliefs about one’s divinity or ability to perform miracles confers 
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power over those who expect to enjoy the benefits of a relationship with such 
individuals. Beliefs that offer explanations for unknown phenomena are useful in 
the sense that, by offering knowledge, they help with predictability which, in turn, 
reduces anxiety. When beliefs are useful, they can easily turn into convictions.
Empirically acquired beliefs are expectations based on the repetition and pat-
ternicity of previous experiences. Thus, I believe the sun will rise tomorrow because 
I have experienced such a pattern in the past. My dog believes it is about to go for a 
walk, because I always put on a specific coat and get the leash from the coat hanger. 
My cats believe they will be fed every morning and, as I enter the kitchen after I 
wake up they are standing and waiting by the cat bowls. These are beliefs shaped by 
associative learning.
Informational acquired beliefs are those acquired by perception of messages 
sent by others. The similarity between alarm calls in Diana Monkeys and reading 
the news by humans resides in the content of what is communicated, perceived and 
interpreted by the brain. The difference relates to the medium by which the message 
is sent and the semantic complexity of its content.
Understanding how empirically shaped beliefs may trigger behavioural 
responses is relatively straightforward, but informational acquired beliefs require 
an assessment of their reliability or truth. And in humans such beliefs contribute 
to more than simple behavioural responses. They have effects on the mind and the 
self. This is reflected in approaches based on religion or psychotherapy. Through 
the means of self-suggestion, individuals can change their state of mind leading 
to calmness or anxiety, happiness or depression. Most of these states of mind are 
induced by the content of the information and not by experience.
Research on economic decision-making in animals has provided even more 
support for the assumption that animals hold beliefs. Economic decision making 
involves weighing up different beneficial alternatives to maximise payoff. This 
means that animals are given a choice between accepting an immediate small 
reward or delay the decision to acquire a larger reward. This implies that the animal 
has a knowledge and must hold an expectation or belief that a larger reward is to 
come later. Such behaviours have been observed in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) 
brown capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.), dogs, sea lions (Zalophus californianus), 
corvids and parrots [52].
Evidence of processes that support the presence and formation of complex 
types of belief in animals are a good indication that human belief construction has 
biological roots and is an adaptation resulting from evolutionary pathways.
© 2021 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
23
An Evolutionary Approach to the Adaptive Value of Belief
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.97538
[1] Pinto, A.A. and Bright, P (2016)-The 
Biology of Resilient Beliefs. Current 
Ethology. 15 (1): 30-54
[2] Povinelli, D.J. & Vonk, J. (2003). 
"Chimpanzee minds: Suspiciously 
human?". Trends in Cognitive Sciences.  
7 (4): 157-160.
[3] .Horowitz, A. (2011)- Theory of 
mind in dogs? Examining method and 
concept". Learning & Behavior. 39 (4): 
314-317.
[4] Dally, J.M.; Emery, N.J.; Clayton, 
N.S. (2006). "Food-caching western 
scrub-jays keep track of who was 
watching when". Science. 312 (5780): 
1662-1665
[5] Hume, D. (1748) -An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding. 
Applied Epistemology, 9. Of the reason of 
animals (comparable to man). Available 




[6] Cooper, W.S. (2001)-The Evolution 
of Reason. Logic as a Branch of Biology. 
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy And 
Biology. Cambridge University Press.
[7] Bastos, A.P.M. and Taylor, A.H. 
(2020)-Kea show three signatures of 
domain generated statistical inference. 
Nature Communications, 11(1):  
828.
[8] Poulin-Dubois, D., Lepage, A., 
Ferland, D. (1996)-Infant’s concept of 
animacy. Cognitive Development. 11 
(1): 19-36
[9] Leslie, A.M. (1988)- Some 
implications of pretense for mechanisms 
underlying the child’s theory of mind. In 
Developing Theories of Mind, .J.W. 
Astingtion, P.L. Harris and D. Olson 
(Eds). Cambridge University Press.
[10] Quin, P.C. and Eimas, P.D. 
(1996)-Perceptual organization and 
categorization in young infants. In C. 
Rovee-Collier & L.P. Lipsitt (Eds), 
Advances in infancy research, Vo.10  
((p. 1-36)-Ablex Publishing
[11] Mandler, J.M. (1992)- How to build 
a baby: II. Conceptual primitives. 
Psychological Review, 99(4), 587-604.
[12] Povinelli, D. (2000)-Folk Physics for 
Apes. The Chimpanzee’s Theory of How 
the World Works. Oxford 
University Press
[13] Abonen, J. (2014a) Magic for dogs. 
Retrieved from https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=VEQXeLjY9ak . Accessed 
Jan 2021
[14] Abonen, J. (2014b) How Dogs  




[15] Pearce, J.M. (2008)- Animal 
Learning and Cognition. An 
introduction. 2nd Edition. Psychology  
Press
[16] Wynne, C.D.L. (2001)-Animal 
Cognition. The mental lives of Animals. 
Palgrave
[17] Von Frisch, K. (2013)-The dance 
language and orientation of bees. 
Harvard University Press
[18] Galef, B. and Whiskin, E.E. (1992)- 
Social transmission of information 
about multiflavored foods. Animal 
Learning and Behaviour, 20: 56-62
[19] Sherwin, C.M., Heyes, C.M., Nicol, 
C.J. (2002)-Social learning influences 
the preferences of domestic hens for 
novel food. Animal Behaviour, 63 
(5):933-942
References
Evolutionary Psychology Meets Social Neuroscience
24
[20] Donato, D., & Potts, R. (2004). 
Culturally transmitted predation and 
consumption techniques by Torresian 
Crows “Corvus orru” on Cane Toads 
“Bufo marinus.” Australian Field 
Ornithology, 21(3), 125-126.
[21] Sasvári. L. (1979)- Observational 
learning in great, blue and marsh tits. 
Animal Behaviour. 27 (3): 769-771
[22] Furlong, F.E., Boose, K.J. and 
Boysen, S.T. (2007)-Ranking it in: the 
impact of enculturation on chimpanzee 
tool use. Animal Cognition. 11: 83-97
[23] Visalberghi, W. (1990) -Tool use in 
Cebus. Folia Primatologica. 54: 146-154
[24] Chappell, J., Kacelnik, A. (2002)-
Tool selectivity in a non-primate, the 
New Caledonian crow 
(Corvus,pneduloides). Animal Cognition. 
5: 71-78
[25] Bluff, L.A., Troscianko, J., Weir, 
A.A.S., Kacelnic, A., Rutz, C. (2010)-
Tool use by wild New Caledonian crows, 
Corvus moneduloides at natural foraging 
sites. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society B. 277 (16): 1471-2954
[26] Seed, A.M., Tebbich, S., Emery, 
N.J., Clayton, N.S. (2006)-Investigating 
physical cognition in rooks (Corvus 
frugilegus). Current Biology 16:697-701
[27] Krützen, M., Mann, J., Heithaus, 
M.R., Connor, R.C., Bejder, L. and 
Sherwin, W.B. (2005)-Cultural 
transmission of tool use in bottlenose 
dolphins. PNAS. 102 (25): 8939-8943.
[28] Smolker, R., Richards, A., Connor, 
R., Mann, J. and Berggren, P. 
(1997)-Sponge carrying by dolphins 
(Delphinidae, Tursiops sp.): A foraging 
specialization involving tool use? 
Ethology. 103 (6): 454-465
[29] Thorndike, E. L. (1927)- The Law of 
Effect. The American Journal of 
Psychology. 39 (1/4): 212-222
[30] Møller, A.P., Pomiankowski, A. 
(1993)- Fluctuating asymmetry and 
sexual selection. Genetica. 89: 267-279.
[31] Gangestad, S., Thornhill, R., Yeo, R. 
A. (1994)-Facial attractiveness, 
developmental stability, and fluctuating 
asymmetry. Ethology and Sociobiology. 
15 (2): 73-85
[32] Seyfarth, R.M., Cheney, D.L. and 
Marler, P. (1980)- Vervet monkey alarm 
calls: semantic communication in a 
free-ranging primate. Animal 
Behaviour. 28:1070-1094
[33] Tomasello, M. and Call, J. (1997)- 
Primate Cognition. Oxford 
University Press
[34] Nowak, M.A. and Sigmund, K. 
(2005)- Evolution of indirect 
reciprocity. Nature. 437:1291-1298
[35] Byrne, R.W. and Whiten, A. (1990)- 
Machiavellian Intelligence: Social 
Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect 
in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans. 
Behavior and Philosophy. 18 (1): 
73-75
[36] Gouzoules, S., Gouzoules, H., 
Marler, P. (1984)- Rhesus monkey 
(Macaca mulatta) screams: 
representational signalling in the 
recruitment of agonistic aid. Animal 
Behaviour. 32 (1): 182-184
[37] McGetrick, J. and Range, F. 
(2018)-Inequity Aversion in Dogs: A 
review. Learning and Behaviour. 46: 
479-500.
[38] Dehaene, S., Dehaene-Lambertz, 
G., Cohen, L. (1989)-Abstract 
representations of numbers in the 
animal and human brain. Trends in 
Neurosciences. 21 (8): 355-365
[39] Pepperberg, I.M. (1999)- The Alex 
Studies: cognitive and communicative 
abilities of grey parrots. Harvard 
University Press
25
An Evolutionary Approach to the Adaptive Value of Belief
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.97538
[40] Zental, T. and Hogan, D. (1974)- 
Abstract concept learning in the pigeon. 
Journal of experimental Psychology. 102 
(3): 393-398
[41] Festinger, L. (1957)- A Theory of 
Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford 
University Press.
[42] Timberlake, W. and Lucas, G.A. 
(1985)- The basis of superstitious 
behaviour: chance contingency, 
stimulus substitution or appetitive 
behaviour? Journal of the Experimental 
Analysis of Behavior. 44 (3):279-299.
[43] Bargh, J. (2017)-Before you know it. 
The unconscious reasons we do what we 
do. William Heinemann. London
[44] Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Krunglanski, 
A.W and Sulloway, F. J. (2003)-Political 
Conservatism as Motivated Social 
Cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129 
(3):339-375
[45] Nail, P.R., McGregor, I., Drinkwater, 
A.E., Steele, G. M. and Thompson, A. 
W. (2009)-Threat causes liberals to 
think like conservatives. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology. 
45: 901-907
[46] Harman, O. (2010)- The Price of 
Altruism: George Price and the Search for 
the Origins of Kindness. Vintage. Random 
House. London
[47] Hamilton, W.D. (1963)- The 
Evolution of Altruism. The American 
Naturalist. 97 (896): 354
[48] Dawkins, R. (1976)-The Selfish 
Gene. Oxford University Press.
[49] Jost J.T., Federico C.M, Napier JL. 
(2009)-Political ideology: its structure, 
functions, and elective affinities. 
Annual Review of Psychology. 60, 
307-337.
[50] Workman, L. and Reader, W. 
(2004)-Chapter 7-The evolutionary 
psychology of social behaviour-kin 
relationships and conflict. In 
Evolutionary Psychology. An 
Introduction. Cambridge 
University Press.
[51] Felton, W. and Pugliese, B. 
(2017)-Tactics Versus Strategies. In 
Encyclopedia of Evolutionary 
Psychology Science. Ed. Shackelford, 
T.K. and Weekes-Shackelford, V.A.
[52] Krasheninnikova, A., Höner, F., 
O’neill, L., Penna, E. and Bayern, A.M.P. 
(2018)-Economic Decision-Making in 
Parrots. Nature Scientific 
Reports. 8:12537
